

5. Public Key Cryptosystems

5.1. Public Key Distribution Systems

The *public key distribution algorithm* proposed by Diffie and Hellman appears to be difficult for computing logarithms over $GF(q)$ with q elements $\{0, 1, 2, \dots, q-1\}$. Consider a pair of inverse functions

$$C = \alpha^M \pmod{q};$$

$$M = \log_{\alpha} C \pmod{q},$$

where $0 < M, C < q$, respectively, q is prime, and α is primitive element of $GF(q)$. Calculation of C from M is easy, but computation of M from C is more difficult, because computing logarithms over $GF(q)$ is believed to be much harder. The possible solution to a public-key distribution is

1. Each user A and B generates an independent random number M_i and M_j chosen uniformly from the set of integers $\{1, 2, \dots, q-1\}$, and keep this numbers secret.
2. Both users make the following calculations A calculate $C_i = \alpha^{M_i} \pmod{q}$, and B calculate $C_j = \alpha^{M_j} \pmod{q}$ and place the values of C_i, C_j in a public file.
3. User A computes K_{ij} by obtaining C_j from the public file and letting

$$K_{ij} = C_j^{M_i} \pmod{q} = (\alpha^{M_j})^{M_i} \pmod{q} = \alpha^{M_j M_i} \pmod{q}$$

user B obtains the common key K_{ij} in a similar fashion as

$$K_{ji} = C_i^{M_j} \pmod{q} = (\alpha^{M_i})^{M_j} \pmod{q} = \alpha^{M_i M_j} \pmod{q}$$

We can see that $K_{ij} = K_{ji}$, that is why both users have the same key.

The other user must compute the $K_{ij} = K_{ji}$ from C_j and C_i by computing

$$K_{ij} = K_{ji} = C_i^{(\log_{\alpha} C_j)} \pmod{q}$$

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Example 5.1. Consider a prime field $GF(q)$ with a prime number q . Let α be a fixed primitive element of $GF(q)$ such that the powers of α produce all nonzero elements $1, 2, \dots, q-1$ of $GF(q)$. Let us pick $\alpha = 2$ and $q = 11$. The powers of $\alpha = 2 \pmod{11}$ produce the following table.

λ	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
α^λ	2^0	2^1	2^2	2^3	2^4	2^5	2^6	2^7	2^8	2^9
$\alpha^\lambda \pmod{11}$	1	2	4	8	5	10	9	7	3	6

To initiate communication, user A chooses a random number $M_i = 5$ from the integer set $2^\lambda \pmod{11} = \{1, 2, 3, \dots, 10\}$ in the above table and keeps it secret. Then he calculates $C_i = \alpha^{M_i} \pmod{q} = 2^5 \pmod{11} = 10$, and B generates secret $M_j = 7$ to calculate $C_j = \alpha^{M_j} \pmod{q} = 2^7 \pmod{11} = 7$. Finally both users A and B send their results $C_i = 10$ and $C_j = 7$ of calculation to partner to obtain the common key

$$K_{ij} = C_j^{M_i} \pmod{q} = (\alpha^{M_j})^{M_i} \pmod{q} = 7^5 \pmod{11} = 10$$

user B obtains the common key K_{ji} in a similar fashion as

$$K_{ji} = C_i^{M_j} \pmod{q} = (\alpha^{M_i})^{M_j} \pmod{q} = 10^7 \pmod{11} = 10$$

Thus, each user completes computation of the common key 10. 2

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Example 5.2. Consider the key exchange problem in $GF(2^m)$ for $m=3$. A primitive polynomial $p(x)$ of degree $m=3$ over $GF(2)$ is $p(x)=1+x+x^3$. If α be a root of $p(x)$ over $GF(2)$, then the field elements of $GF(2^3)$ generated by $p(\alpha)=1+\alpha+\alpha^3=0$ are shown below

	Power	Polynomial	Vector
	α^0	1	1 0 0
	α^1	α	0 1 0
	α^2	α^2	0 0 1
	α^3	$1 + \alpha$	1 1 0
	α^4	$\alpha + \alpha^2$	0 1 1
	α^5	$1 + \alpha + \alpha^2$	1 1 1
	α^6	$1 + \alpha^2$	1 0 1
α^7	1	1 0 0	

Suppose users A and B select $M_i=2$ and $M_j=5$, respectively. Both $M_i=2$ and $M_j=5$ are kept secret, but $C_i=\alpha^{M_i} \pmod{p(x)} = \alpha^2 \pmod{(1+x+x^3)} = 001$ and $C_j=\alpha^{M_j} \pmod{p(x)} = \alpha^5 \pmod{(1+x+x^3)} = 111$ are placed in the public file. User A can communicate with user B by taking $C_j=111$ from the public file and computing their common key K_{ij} as follows

$$K_{ij} = (C_j)^{M_i} \pmod{p(x)} = (\alpha^5)^2 \pmod{p(x)} = \alpha^{10} \pmod{p(x)} = \alpha^3 = 110$$

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5.2. Knapsack Cryptosystems

The knapsack problem is a mathematically attractive proportion for cryptography. The Merkle-Hellman scheme based on the trapdoor knapsack problem is a public-key asymmetric cryptosystem.

Assume a key $K = \{k_1, k_2, \dots, k_n\}$, where k_i are integers for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ and the n -bit plaintext $M = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$, where $x_i = \{0, 1\}$. Then the knapsack cryptosystem enciphers the n -bit plaintext into the n -bit ciphertext according to the following formula:

$$C = KM = k_1x_1 + k_2x_2 + \dots + k_nx_n.$$

Calculation of C is as simple as seen from above equation, but recovery of M from C and K involves solving a knapsack problem and is generally difficult when n is large and K is randomly chosen.

If the key K is chosen such that each element of K is larger than the sum of the preceding elements, the corresponding knapsack problem becomes very simple. That is $k_i > k_1 + k_2 + k_3 + \dots + k_{i-1}$. Letting $c_1 = k_1x_1$, $c_2 = k_1x_1 + k_2x_2$, $c_n = k_1x_1 + k_2x_2 + \dots + k_nx_n$. where c_n represents the ciphertext C i.e. $C = y_n$. Now, the plaintext M can be recovered from y_n for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$ and the key K according to the following procedure. If $y_n < k_n$, then set $x_n = 0$ and $y_{n-1} = y_n$. If $y_n > k_n$, then set $x_n = 1$ and $y_{n-1} = y_n - k_n$. Using the computed value y_{n-1} we can find x_{n-1} and y_{n-2} in a similar fashion. The recovery procedure continues until $M = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}$, has been completely recreated.

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Example 5.3. Suppose the plaintext $M=\{11001\}$ and the key $K=\{151, 187, 426, 1091, 2412\}$, the ciphertext C becomes

$$C=K*M=1*151+1*187+0*426+0*1091+1*2412=2750$$

Since $C=y_5=2750$ is the ciphertext, the recovery of x_5 from y_5 and k_5 is $x_5=1$ because $y_5=2750>k_5=2412$. Hence the procedure for recovery of x_i for $i=1,2,\dots,5$ will continue as shown below.

$$y_5=2750>k_5=2412, x_5=1;$$

$$y_4=y_5-k_5=338<k_4=1091, x_4=0;$$

$$y_3=338<k_3=426, x_3=0;$$

$$y_2=338>k_2=187, x_2=1;$$

$$y_1=y_2-k_2=151=k_1, x_1=1.$$

Thus the recovered plaintext is $M=\{11001\}$ as expected. However, this simple knapsack vector K cannot be used as a public enciphering key because someone can easily recover M from C .

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5.2. Knapsack Cryptosystems

The public key is a vector $K_p = wK_p^*$ which is also published by the user as his public key, while the parameters $v = w^{-1}$ and m kept secret as his private keys. K_p is generated by multiplying each component of the knapsack secret vector $K_p^* = \{k_1^*, k_2^*, \dots, k_n^*\}$ by w modulo m such that

$$k_p = wk_p^* \pmod{m}, \quad i=1,2,\dots,n$$

Recovering the original plaintext M from the ciphertext C sometimes requires the transformation of C into C^* via v which is the multiplicative inverse of w modulo m . That is,

$$C^* = vC \pmod{m},$$

where a secret quantity $v = w^{-1}$ is calculated from m and w , where $m > w$ and $(w, m) = 1$. Moreover, m has to be larger than $k_1 + k_2 + \dots + k_n$ according to

$$wv = 1 \pmod{m} \quad \text{or} \quad ww^{-1} = 1 \pmod{m}$$

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5.3. Exponentiation Ciphers

In 1978, Pohling and Hellman published an encryption scheme based on computing exponentials over a finite field. At about the same time, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman published a similar scheme, but with a slight twist - a twist that gave the MIT group a method for realizing public-key encryption as put forth by Diffie and Hellman.

The Pohling-Hellman and RSA schemes both encipher a message block $M=0,1,\dots,n-1$ by computing the exponential

$$C=M^e \bmod n,$$

where e and n are the key to the enciphering transformation. M is restored by the same operation, but using a different exponent d for the key:

$$M=C^d \bmod n.$$

Enciphering and deciphering can be implemented using the fast exponentiation algorithm shown below, so $C=\text{fastexp}(M,e,n)$ and $M=\text{fastexp}(C,d,n)$.

The enciphering and deciphering transformations are based on Euler's generalization of Fermat's Theorem, which states that for every M relatively prime to n :

$$M^{\phi(n)} \bmod n = 1.$$

This property implies that if e and d satisfy the relation $ed \bmod \phi(n)=1$, then deciphering restores the original plaintext message. This result is proved in the following theorem:

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5.4. Fermat's Theorem

Theorem 5.1. Given e and d satisfying $ed \bmod \phi(n) = 1$ and a message $M = 0, 1, \dots, n-1$ such that $\gcd(M, n) = 1$, then

$$(M^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n = M.$$

Proof: We have

$$(M^e \bmod n)^d \bmod n = M^{ed} \bmod n.$$

Now, $ed \bmod \phi(n) = 1$ implies that $ed = t\phi(n) + 1$ for some integer t .

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} M^{ed} \bmod n &= M^{t\phi(n)+1} \bmod n = M M^{t\phi(n)} \bmod n = M (M^{t\phi(n)} \bmod n) \bmod n \\ &= M (M^{\phi(n)} \bmod n)^t \bmod n = M 1^t \bmod n = M. \end{aligned}$$

By symmetry, enciphering and deciphering are commutative and mutual inverses; thus,

$$(M^d \bmod n)^e \bmod n = M^{de} \bmod n = M.$$

Given $\phi(n)$, it is easy to generate a pair (e, d) satisfying $ed \bmod \phi(n) = 1$. This is done by first choosing d relatively prime $\phi(n)$, and then using the extended version of Euclid's algorithm to compute its inverse:

$$e = \text{inv}(d, \phi(n)).$$

Because e and d are symmetric, we could also pick e and compute $d = \text{inv}(e, \phi(n))$.

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5.4. Pohling-Hellman Scheme

In the Pohlig-Hellman Scheme, the modulus is chosen to be large prime p . The enciphering and deciphering functions are thus given by

$$C = M^e \text{ mod } p$$

$$M = C^d \text{ mod } p,$$

where all arithmetic is done in the Galois field $GF(p)$. Because p is prime, $\phi(n) = p - 1$, which is trivially derived from p . Thus the scheme can be used for conventional encryption, where e and d are both kept secret.

Example 5.4. Let $p = 11$, whence $\phi(n) = p - 1 = 10$. Choose $d = 7$ and compute $e = \text{inv}(7, 10) = 3$. Suppose, $M = 5$. Then M is enciphered as:

$$C = M^e \text{ mod } p = 5^3 \text{ mod } 11 = 4.$$

Similarly, C is deciphered as:

$$M = C^d \text{ mod } p = 4^7 \text{ mod } 11 = 5.$$

The security of the scheme rests on the complexity of computing discrete logarithms in $GF(p)$.

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5.5. Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Scheme

In the RSA scheme, the modulus n is the product of two large primes p and q :

$$n=pq.$$

Thus, $\phi(n)=(p-1)(q-1)$. The enciphering and deciphering functions are

$$C=M^e \text{ mod } n$$

$$M=C^d \text{ mod } n,$$

Example 5.5. Let $p=5, q=7$ whence $n=pq=35$ and $\phi(n)=(5-1)(7-1)=24$. Choose $d=11$. and compute $e=\text{inv}(11,24)=11$. Suppose, $M=2$. Then M is enciphered as:

$$C=M^e \text{ mod } p=2^{11} \text{ mod } 35=2048 \text{ mod } 35 = 18. \text{ and } M=C^d \text{ mod } p=18^{11} \text{ mod } 35=2.$$

Example 5.6. Let $p=53, q=61$ whence $n=pq=53 \cdot 61=3233$ and $\phi(n)=(53-1)(61-1)=3120$. Letting $d=791$, we get $e=71$. To encipher the message $M=\text{RENAISSANCE}$, we break it into blocks of 4 digits each, where A=00, B=01, ..., Z=25, and blank =26. We thus get

$$\begin{aligned} M &= RE \quad NA \quad IS \quad SA \quad NC \quad E \\ M &= 1704 \quad 1300 \quad 0818 \quad 1800 \quad 1302 \quad 0426 \end{aligned}$$

The first block is enciphered as $1704^{71}=3106$. The entire message is enciphered as

$$C=3106 \quad 0100 \quad 0931 \quad 2691 \quad 1984 \quad 2927.$$

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5.5. Procedure RSA's Key Generation

1. Select two secret primes, p and q , where a) p and q differ in 11 by a few digits; b) both $p-1$ and $q-1$ should contain large prime factors; c) $\gcd(p-1, q-1)$ should be small.
2. Compute the product $n=pq$, which is the public modulus, where p and q are randomly selected.
3. Calculate Euler's function, $\phi(n)=(p-1)(q-1)$, which gives the secret number.
4. Select the key e or d , which is relatively prime to $\phi(n)$.
5. Calculate the multiplicative inverse of either d or e mod $\phi(n)=1$ modulo n according to the equation $ed \bmod \phi(n)=1$.